NAPOLEON’S RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN: THE MARCH TO THE NIEMEN
Historical context
This timeline forms part of our close-up on: Napoleon's Russian campaign: the march to the Niemen.
Following Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire, intent on capturing vast swathes of Turkish territory after Ottoman forces had deposed the pro-Russian rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia. Russian troops overran Moldavia and Wallachia in an assault orchestrated by Nikolay Rumiantsev, Russia's foreign minister. The war dragged on until 1812, when it was brought to an end with a hastily-agreed peace treaty, signed just a few weeks before Napoleon's crossing of the Niemen. At the same time, Russia was also waging a war – declared in 1804 – with Persia, which saw territory in the Caucasus, Georgia and near the Aras River hotly disputed. This war only came to an end in 1813.
After the Battle of Friedland and with Russia fearing insurrection in its Polish territories in Eastern Europe, on 7 July 1807 Napoleon and Alexander I came together at Tilsit to sign a peace treaty. The meeting became known for its location – a raft anchored in the middle of the Niemen River – and Russia's enforced participation in Napoleon's Continental Blockade. Importantly, Russia also agreed to withdraw from Moldavia and Wallachia, territory that it had seized during the ongoing war with the Ottoman Empire, and – in an alliance agreed between the two empires – committed to declaring war on Britain.
The treaty signed two days later with Prussia was also to have a profound effect on Franco-Russian relations. As punishment for being on the wrong side in 1806 and 1807, Prussia lost nearly five million inhabitants, some of which went into the newly-resurrected Polish state, the Duchy of Warsaw. This vassal state, in union with the King of Saxony but in reality governed by the French ambassador in Warsaw, came into being as an effort to introduce yet more of Europe into the Napoleonic system, Napoleon's vision of a quasi-federated continent. Its creation also had the added advantage of creating a barrier between the French empire and Russian interests in Eastern Europe.
As a result of the treaty agreed at Tilsit, Alexander I had gone ahead with his plans to seize Finland: the Finnish war was fought between February 1808 and September 1809, and the resulting Treaty of Fredrikshamn – signed on 17 September 1809 – saw Finland, previously in Swedish hands, become the Grand Duchy of Finland and part of the Russian empire.
In 1808, Napoleon began to turn his attention to empires of the Iberian Peninsula. In order to extend his influence there, he began pulling a large number of his troops out of central Europe and throwing them into this region. In this context, at the diplomatic summit at Erfurt, on 12 October 1808, Napoleon called again on his ally Alexander to act as dissuasion against any Austrian attempt to attack France once the French emperor's back was turned. The subject of the Ottoman Empire once again came up, with Alexander intent on capitalising on a series of palace intrigues to proceed with his dismemberment of the Porte's lands. He was also banking on territorial compensation for his declaration of war on Britain, as outlined in the secret articles at Tilsit. Napoleon, who had signed a treaty with the sultan in 1802, was not however about to allow Russia a clear route to the Mediterranean and ensured that nothing was agreed. Alexander came away disappointed, his designs on Ottoman territory thwarted. He was not the only one to leave frustrated: Erfurt was also notable for Talleyrand's involvement in pushing – behind Napoleon's back – the Russian tsar to resisting Napoleon's overtures for an open alliance against Austria. In fact, the diplomatic chicanery around Erfurt was to lay bear the fragile nature of the Franco-Russian alliance.
Although Russia had agreed to enter into the Continental Blockade – a step that Napoleon believed essential to the eventual victory over Britain – following the treaty at Tilsit, Alexander's commitment was at best half-hearted. Russia's economy was extremely dependent on British trade, and Napoleon's blockade saw the tsar obliged to turn away British ships – thus depriving himself of import duties and British goods – and accept French products into the country instead. After 1809, the blockade – already maintained with reluctance – was enforced even less stringently, with “neutral” ships freely allowed into port. Although not British, these ships were often American, and also – frequently – arrived in port laden with British goods, thus contravening Napoleon's grand system.
Further international tension was to be added by Napoleon's marriage to Marie-Louise, in April 1810. Metternich, the Austrian Foreign Minister, predicted that the emperor's new matrimonial ties with Austria would only fuel the increasing concerns felt by Russia towards France and that this would most likely cause problems further down the line.
Poland
Poland was to prove a key point of contention between Russia and France. Any potential alliance discussed by the two rulers was stymied by their respective reluctance to compromise. Alexander wanted a clear and forthright declaration that Napoleon would support no independent Polish state, whilst Napoleon saw no need to make such a commitment, and indeed objected to such a demand being made. Three projects for a Franco-Russian agreement over Polish lands were floated, and each one came unstuck. Indeed, in January 1810, Caulaincourt (French ambassador to Russia) and Rumiantsev, agreed on a draft convention that banned the restoration of the independent Polish state. Napoleon however rejected it. In a letter dated 24 April 1810, Napoleon argued that any declaration against an independent Polish state had to be met with a Russian declaration against the restoration of the Kingdom of Sardinia. The king, who had been forced to flee to Sardinia and watch the kingdom incorporated into the French Empire, maintained a diplomatic presence at the Russian court. Once again, Napoleon knew that Alexander would be politically unable to consent to his suggestions. By July 1810, Napoleon was refusing point blank to make any sort of declaration: in his meeting with Prince Alexis Kurakin, Russian envoy in Paris, as reported in volume two of Vandal's Napoléon et Alexandre (pp.417-424), he declared “French blood will not be spilt fighting for Poland, but nor will it be spilt fighting against this unhappy nation. It would be utterly demeaning to my person to make that commitment or any such similar one.”
The Polish question brought Napoleon into conflict with Rumiantsev, and Prince Alexander Kurakin, Russian ambassador to France. Rumiantsev continued to agitate for a clear proclamation from Napoleon regarding his intentions for Poland, and the publication of a pro-Polish tract in the Duchy of Warsaw was taken by the Foreign Minister as Napoleon's tacit support for the movement. In a letter sent in Champagny's name, but dictated by Napoleon, to Caulaincourt, French ambassador to the Russian court, the emperor could no longer hide his growing impatience and frustration with Russia:
“The emperor, sir, who has for several weeks listened with displeasure to the injurious suspicions continuously emanating from Russia, which at times chooses to suggest that he is fomenting trouble in Poland, at others considers him responsible for articles in gazettes that have been written two hundred leagues from Paris, or brochures which shall forever remain unknown in France – much like their authors – was further upset by the phrase in the letter from M. Rumiantsev which seems to contain a formal accusation. 'What, asked the emperor, does Russia mean by such language? Does she seek war? Why these unending complaints? Why these injurious suspicions? If I had wished to re-establish Poland, I would have said so, and I would not have withdrawn my troops from Germany. Does Russia seek to prepare me for her defection?” [1 July 1810, n° 16,181, Second Empire edition]
By mid-1810, this clash over Poland led to Russian attempts to re-negotiate the Tilsit agreement. However, Kurakin's lack of authorisation to discuss the articles of any potential alliance allowed Napoleon to dismiss any further discussion on the matter. After the fire at the Austrian embassy in Paris on 1 July 1810, which left the Russian ambassador badly burned and fighting for his life, Napoleon addressed a note to Charles de Nesselrode, the deputy head of the Russian mission in Paris, inquiring as to whether the tsar's representative would be in a position to discuss a new Franco-Russian treaty, presumably knowing full well that he was not. This offer was furthermore not sincere since when Nesselrode proposed that he should take any discussions to his government on behalf of Napoleon, the emperor did not take him up. Alexander was beginning to think seriously about the usefulness of the alliance.
Indeed, in the first month of 1811, Alexander I began a correspondence with Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, the celebrated Polish diplomat, close personal friend to the tsar and former Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Russian court. But even before the full extent of Napoleon's annexation of the Hanseatic states became known to him (see below), Alexander had begun to explore in depth an offensive against the French emperor, targeting first of all the reconstitution of a Polish Kingdom (allied, naturally, to the Russian empire). The plan hinged on creating a domino effect in Europe: an invasion of the Duchy of Warsaw with a force of “100,000 Russians” would then be followed by the Polish population rallying to Alexander before overthrowing the French troops in the surrounding area. The German states would soon be inspired to join the new coalition; Alexander even envisioned an alliance with Austria once the balance of power in Europe had sufficiently altered. Playing on Czartoryski's patriotism, Alexander charged his friend with 'putting the feelers out' to the government and military command in Warsaw, informing him that such an operation – which would leave his country eternally indebted to him – could only succeed if Russia received “indubitable assurances” of Poland's co-operation. Uncertainty among Polish leaders regarding Russia's motives was to prove a stumbling block, however, and it did not take long for the French authorities to learn of Alexander's plans. By the spring of 1811, the project had been shelved.
A deteriorating relationship
The grievances were beginning to stack up. At the end of 1810, a large number of vessels from a convoy carrying British goods and proceeding through the Baltic successfully landed in Russian ports as neutral ships or were simply left to continue their journey. Napoleon realised that Alexander no longer had any intention of respecting what they had agreed at Tilsit, and, with more and more vessels landing in Russia, on 13 December 1810, a sénatus-consulte was announced which formally incorporated the Hanseatic cities of Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg into the French empire. Despite French military presence in the ports for more than four years, fraud and counterfeit were still widespread and the annexation was intended to strengthen the blockade along the Baltic. Notably, this act also annexed a number of territories linked to the ports, including the Duchy of Oldenburg. This small dukedom was ruled by the regent Peter I, whose son George was married to Alexander I's sister, Catherine Pavlovna of Russia. Napoleon offered Erfurt to Peter as compensation for Oldenburg, a proposition that was poorly received both in Oldenburg and in Russia. Although initially intent on remaining in place with severe restrictions imposed upon his rule, the duke was soon forcibly ejected. By an imperial decree dated 22 January 1811, Napoleon ordered the displacement of the Oldenburg family and the seizure of the dukedom, contravening the treaty of Tilsit (article 12), and further worsening Franco-Russian diplomatic relations.
The turn of the year was to prove particularly trying for both sovereigns. On 31 December 1810, the Russian tsar announced an ukase (proclamation) decreeing that goods (other than those of British provenance) could once again enter Russia via its ports, whilst imports entering the empire over land (the majority of which was of French origin) would be hit with heavy duties. Despite the ukase's stipulations, Russia was effectively open to British trade again. Moreover, any goods found to have entered the country illegally would be destroyed. Such a change in commercial policy – announced without consulting the French emperor – merely heaped further pressure on the two nations' diplomatic relations. Napoleon's letter, dated 28 February 1811, mixed melodrama and unconcealed menace but was a clear sign that the relationship was on the rocks.
“I cannot conceal from myself the fact that Your Majesty no longer has any regard for me. […] [Your] latest ukase is, in content and most especially form, specifically directed against France. […] Britain and Europe already believe our alliance is no more. […] If Your Majesty will permit me to speak with candour: You have forgotten what profit You have gained from the alliance […] I am struck by the evidence of these facts and by the thought that Your Majesty is entirely disposed, a soon as circumstance permits it, to come to an agreement with Britain; this would be nothing less than inciting war between the two empires [i.e. France and Russia]. Were Your Majesty both to abandon the alliance and destroy the Tilsit conventions, it is clear that war would follow, sooner or later. This atmosphere of distrust and uncertainty is inconvenient for both Your Majesty's empire and mine. […] If Your Majesty has no intention of returning to Britain's side, You will appreciate the necessity of clearing up all this confusion, for my benefit and Yours.”
Russia however had been active behind Napoleon's back for months. Between the spring and winter of 1810, Colonel Alexander Chernichev's diplomatic mission to Paris (a front for intelligence gathering) and close relationship with Bernadotte had allowed Russia to both cultivate ties with the newly-elected Swedish crown prince and obtain intelligence on Napoleon's policies. The Russian officer's espionage was uncovered, however, and after a private interview with Napoleon – during which the French emperor made it clear that the game was up – the Russian officer promptly left Paris, having burned his personal papers. The identity of the French mole handled by Chernichev – a certain “Michel” working in the Ministry of War Administration who had access to army strength tables, and accurate troop positions and movements – was uncovered following the Russian officer's flight at the end of February 1812. Although Chernichev was allowed to leave French territory – Napoleon was not prepared to provoke a diplomatic incident this early on – the French emperor nevertheless took advantage of the deceit to play the injured party in a note which Maret addressed to Kurakin on 3 March 1812. On 1 May 1812, “Michel” was executed for “having supplied intelligence to a foreign power with a view to providing it with the means of making war on France”.
Austrian involvement
By 25 April 1811, Napoleon had made it clear to Metternich that – contrary to initial indications to von Schwarzenberg in September 1810 – any coming conflict would require active participation from Austria. This gave Austria and Francis I understandable cause for concern, particularly with regards to Galicia (part of modern day Poland and Ukraine), which was part of the Austrian empire at this point, along the border with the Duchy of Warsaw. Metternich's note to the Austrian emperor reported on Napoleon's anticipation of insurrection breaking out in Galicia, supported by Polish nationalists. This in turn could lead to a rift between Austria and France. However, any such event in Galicia could also prove beneficial to Austria, and Metternich elaborated on potential territorial compensation. In the event of Austrian neutrality, they could be compensated for the loss of their Galician territory. In the event of Austria's active participation in an eventual French victory, however, far more could be gained, with Metternich arguing that a more powerful France would be moved to compensate Austria for any sacrifices made during the conflict.
Letter that year, on 28 December 1811, Metternich estimated that the Grande Armée would be about 200,000 to 230,000 troops. At the close of 1811, he described Austria as “before an abyss, the depth of which we cannot as yet even begin to estimate” (Mémoires, vol. II, p.428). Ever the pragmatist, he argued that strict neutrality from Austria would result in the collapse of the Austrian monarchy and was therefore the least favourable course of action as it would prevent Austria from benefiting from either side's eventual victory. In the event of strict neutrality and a victorious France over Russia, Metternich envisaged Napoleon taking advantage of peace talks to reorganise Illyrian territories, Galicia, and Bavaria to the detriment of the Austrian monarchy.
He also admitted that Prussia found itself in an extremely difficult geopolitical situation, which was only exacerbated by that king's “natural indecision”. More concerning however was that this indecision made it difficult to decide on an Austrian course of action. If Prussia entered into an alliance with France, Austria would be almost obliged to follow, lest Prussia gain ascendancy over Austria in the eyes of the French emperor. Prussia's participation in the forthcoming conflict would therefore effectively force Austria into abandoning a policy of neutrality. Yet if Prussia was destroyed (a state of affairs that appeared entirely possible at the time), Silesia would benefit, again to the detriment of Austria. Metternich therefore suggested that Austrian participation in the French invasion would be possible, provided Napoleon gave assurances that Austria would not only be compensated for war costs, but would receive considerable geographical compensation, namely Silesia, the Illyrian provinces, and the Inn border (including Salzburg). In exchange Austria would cede a “reasonable” part of Galicia to the Polish kingdom.
In Metternich's eyes, such a course of action was advisable as a French victory was the only thing that could save Austria.
By January 1812, Metternich had a better idea of Austria's future involvement. An Austrian auxiliary corps would operate on the far-right wing of the invasion force and would – if Napoleon had his way – be commanded by Archduke Charles. His second choice, the Prince Schwarzenberg was the next best option. He also reported that Napoleon had declared that any Austrian force would be commanded by an Austrian and would answer directly to him, independent of all other forces in the Grande Armée.
In the end, national self-interest coupled with the threat posed by Russia to Austrian territory in the east (particularly as the Russo-Turkish war raged) drove Metternich to advocate a French alliance.
The role of Sweden
On 19 January 1812, Napoleon authorised Davout to invade and occupy Swedish Pomerania, ostensibly to reinforce the Continental Blockade that was being flouted and secure the French flank for the upcoming campaign. Napoleon also saw the occupation as punishment for Sweden's lax enforcement of his blockade system. French troops under General Friant crossed the border on the night of 26/27 January, and by the end of the month, Bernadotte had learned that Pomerania was occupied. He received no declaration or announcement from the French emperor, and would subsequently turn towards Russia.
Although initially fearful that a French general on the Swedish throne would make Sweden a client state of France, therefore threatening Russia's coastline to the north, Alexander received enough assurances during Chernichev's stay in Paris and his relationship with Bernadotte to feel comfortable that the Swedish ruler would not be entering into any war with Russia. Bernadotte, who was elected crown prince of Sweden on 21 August 1810, was motivated by establishing Swedish independence, which was better provided for with a strong Russia, particularly with regards to the Scandinavian states. Finland was by now a Russian territory and Sweden – even if they did succeed in retaking it – could not hope to hang onto it for too long in face of Russian strength and numbers. If France declared war on Russia, Britain would become allied with Russia. If Sweden accompanied Napoleon into war with Russia, Swedish maritime trade would be seriously threatened by British control of the seas. Bernadotte reasoned (correctly as it would turn out) that territory could be seized from Denmark – a French ally – as compensation for other territorial losses – i.e. Finland – in Scandinavia. In the crown prince's first meeting with the Russian ambassador to Sweden, Peter Suchtelen, he declared “the happiness of Sweden is inseparable from the peace with Russia”. His insistence on remaining neutral continued however to cause concern, right up until 5 April 1812 and the agreement of an alliance.
It was on 5 April 1812 that the Swedish crown prince – contrary to Napoleon's expectations that his former general would fall into line with him – gave notice of his intention to govern Swedish foreign policy as an independent ruler and signed a defensive and offensive alliance with Alexander I and Russia. The treaty outlined the incorporation of Norway – part of the Kingdom of Denmark and therefore a French ally – into the Swedish kingdom, with Sweden agreeing in turn not to contest Russian possession of Finland. Alexander promised troops to Bernadotte in order to seize Norway, with the pay-off being that once Norwegian territory had been secured, Sweden would carry out diversionary operations against Napoleon's rearguard in Germany.
Prussian indecision
After months of dithering, Prussia – caught between Russia and France – finally came down on the side of the French. Alexander I's decision to pursue a defensive policy in the upcoming conflict effectively pushed Prussia into a reluctant alliance with Napoleon. Frederick William III explained to Alexander in a letter dated 19 (Julian)/31 (Gregorian) March 1812 that the Russian tsar's tactics left him with no choice:
“Faithful to your strategy of not taking the offensive, Your Majesty deprived me of any hope of prompt or real assistance and placed me in a situation where the destruction of Prussia would have been the preliminary to a war against Russia.” [Quoted in Dominic Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, p.93]
Signed on 24 February 1812, the alliance effectively transformed Prussia into a rearguard base for the Grande Armée. Further articles saw Frederick William III agree to contribute a contingent of Prussian troops to the allied force being massed by Napoleon, as well as apply the Continental System in Prussian territory and supply provisions to the French army. Despite the king's military commitments, such was Prussia's animosity towards France that a large number of Frederick William's officers resigned their commissions and entered the service of Russia. The treaty was ratified on 5 March.
Hot on the heels of the imperial treaty with Prussia, on 14 March 1812 an alliance between France and Austria was formally agreed and signed. Despite reservations regarding the country's ability to weather the upcoming war, Metternich knew that participation in what he saw as Austria's “guerre de conservation” was inevitable. Key amongst the stipulations was Austria's commitment to provide 30,000 men, commanded by the well-respected Karl Philip von Schwarzenberg, then Austrian ambassador in Paris, who would participate in the upcoming campaign (although they were exempt from involvement in any conflict with Spain or Britain). A key element of the treaty was the agreement that, in the event of a new 'independent' Poland emerging from the forthcoming war, Austria was to sign over Galicia, receiving in exchange the Illyrian Provinces. At the same time, however, Metternich – ever seeking to prepare for all eventualities – assured Alexander that Austrian troops would be fighting a “sham war” against Russian forces.
The Prussian alliance would be followed by an ultimatum from Russia, received by the tsar's representatives in Paris on 14 April 1812, which demanded a French withdrawal from all Prussian lands and fortified sites in order to maintain a neutral buffer zone between the two belligerents. Alexander's military success in Turkey and the recently agreed alliance with Sweden had solidified his resolve and just as Napoleon had sought to manoeuvre Alexander's diplomats over Poland, so he sought to provoke an open declaration of war. In response, Napoleon continued to talk of treaties, but having dispatched his aide-de-camp to Alexander's court with the intention of maintaining the pretence of peace, he left Paris for the German territories. Kurakin was left in the French capital, where he eventually obtained a meeting with Maret, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in order to discuss peace. Upon arriving for his meeting on 9 May, he learned that Napoleon was gone. Despite suggestions that Napoleon was simply visiting his father in law, Kurakin read in the Moniteur on 10 May that Napoleon had headed to Dresden to inspect the army.
Napoleon arrived there at midday on 16 May in the company of a number of German rulers. On 18 May, Francis I arrived and met the imperial couple. During the days that followed, Metternich, who was also present, described how Napoleon initially expected a Russian advance beyond its own borders. Should this not occur, however, the French emperor outlined his understanding of how the war would develop:
“'My enterprise is one of those of which the solution is to be found in patience. Victory will attend the most patient. I shall open the campaign by crossing the Niemen. It will be concluded at Smolensk and Minsk. There I shall stop. I shall fortify these two points, and occupy myself at Wilna, where the chief head-quarters will be during the next winter, with the organisation of Lithuania, which burns with impatience to be delivered from the yoke of Russia. I shall wait and see which of us tires first: I, of feeding my army at the expense of Russia; or Alexander, of sustaining my army at the expense of his country. Perhaps I myself shall pass the most inclement months of the winter at Paris.'”
Metternich proceeded to ask Napoleon what he would do if Alexander initially refused to make peace after the French occupation of Lithuania:
“'In that case I should in the following year advance quite to the centre of the Empire, and I shall be patient in 1813 as I shall have been in 1812! The affair, as I have told you, is a question of time.”
Russian military preparations
Russian planning for the war began as early as 1810, with the publication of Barclay de Tolly's memorandum “The Defence of Russia's Western Frontiers” in March 1810. There was a distinct lack of fortifications along the vast western border of the empire (the last threat to this wing of the empire had been mounted by Sweden's Charles XII, who was defeated by Peter I of Russia at Poltava in 1709). Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, the Russian War Minister, recommended a raised earth offensive withdrawal if Polish territory was invaded, with defensive front established along the Dvina (Daugava) and Dnieper rivers. The intelligence received from Chernichev's activities in Paris also encouraged a defensive policy, citing Napoleon's preference for rapid advances through enemy territory and decisive battles.
A key site was to be the Drissa camp (near Verkhniadzvinsk, Belarus). Early battle plans given to Alexander incorporated an initial advance, a political requirement as much as anything, as a purely defensive withdrawal would result in the loss of Prussia, Russia's ally, to the invading French army. An advance into Poland was also necessary to win Polish nationalists, who might be convinced to fight with Russia if concessions were offered (although Polish suspicion of Alexander's motives and eventual designs on Poland would have to be overcome as well). Such an advance could also hamper Napoleon's advance preparations, preventing him from properly organising his advance stores in Polish territory. A particular fear at the Russian court was what the Polish reaction would be to a Russian policy of retreat. There was serious concern that the educated classes would support Napoleon's advance. These fears resulted in some Russians supporting a more offensive plan against Napoleon. Alexander and Barclay de Tolly knew that Russian numbers, coupled with the likelihood of stretched forces across the vast empire, could not meet the Grande Armée head on. At the same time, however, a defeat back across into Russian territory left the huge and difficult to protect adequately western border open. In many ways, the Russians banked on the peoples affected by the Russian withdrawal tolerating the retreat long enough for Napoleon's impatience to get the better of him, and overstretch himself by launching a march into the Russian heartland.
The Prussian general Karl Ludwig von Pfühl, who served Alexander as an unofficial adviser, advocated a similarly defensive plan, with the Russian army set to retreat back to the Drissa camp upon the outbreak of war. The belief was that the Russian empire could weather the invasion until Napoleon's supplies ran out. Alexander's apparent preference for this ultra-defensive plan – influenced in part by the massive number of troops being assembled by Napoleon – coupled with Pfühl's foreignness made him extremely unpopular at the Russian court. The plan, in the British historian Dominic Lieven's opinion, offered the best chance of saving the heartland of Russia whilst also providing a perfect scapegoat should everything go wrong. Alexander also had to fight against the Russian officer's natural inclination to advance: retreat was considered dishonourable, and such a retrograde movement back into Russian territory could affect army morale.
During the winter of 1811/1812, Russian forces under Mikhail Kutuzov outmanoeuvred the Ottoman army (with whom Russia had been at war since 1806), cutting it off and forcing it to surrender. The war was brought to an effective close. Meanwhile, the Russo-Persian war dragged on. As rumours of the forthcoming conflict between Russia and France reached Persia, a new Persian offensive was mounted. On 13 February 1812, Persian troops succeeded in routing Russian forces commanded by Pyotr Kotlyarevsky at the Battle of Sultanabad (modern-day Arak). Persian joy was to prove short-lived, and Kotlyarevsky defeated Abbas Mirza six months later, at the Battle of Aslanduz on 31 October 1812.
On 2 April 1812, Peter Andrrevich Chuikevich, a former member of Alexander's General Staff and a strategist working in the War Ministry, submitted a memorandum for Barclay de Tolly, offering analysis of Napoleon's preferred method of warfare: a lightning advance followed by quick victories to overwhelm the opposing army. Chuikevich's advice was that Russia should strive to ensure the opposite happened: that a withdrawal, coupled with a war of attrition, raids carried out by flying detachments (made up of light troops), and a wholesale disruption of the enemy's supply lines and communication was the only way to defeat Napoleon.
At the same time, however, there was a general understanding that allies would be few and far between. Despite an agreement with Sweden in April, there was still uncertainty regarding Bernadotte's reliability, whilst any assistance from Britain would almost certainly be limited to financial help. By April 1812, Alexander and the few select members of his inner circle privy to his intelligence knew that Napoleon was amassing a massive army: estimates suggested 450,000 troops, whilst Chuikevich's memorandum numbered Russian effectives at no more than 200,000 to begin with, including 30,000 regular cavalry. To combat this vast outnumbering, Chuikevich proposed inciting rebellion in northern Germany and Pomerania, in the event that allied or Russian forces need to land there later on. In private correspondence, however, Alexander and his generals admitted that the tsar had to envisage giving up more territory than simply the western areas of his empire. There was the distinct possibility that Napoleon could advance deep into Russia before being repelled. Indeed, Count Rostopchin wrote to Alexander on eve of invasion, noting that in the event of initial defeat to Napoleon and a retreat back into Russian heartland, “the Russian emperor will be menacing in Moscow, terrifying in Kazan and invincible in Tobolsk.”
Thus, in April 1812, a state of war in Russia's border provinces was declared, and authorities began requisitioning supplies for the army as the government reacted to France's treaties with Prussia and Austria.
Final preparations
On 25 April, Napoleon dispatched Count Narbonne to Alexander's side to try and buy some more time for the French emperor to further the military preparations already in progress. On 27 April, Russia's ambassador in Paris, Prince Kurakin, threatened to leave the capital if a definitive answer to his note demanding the withdrawal of French troops from Swedish Pomerania and Prussia (delivered in Paris on 14 April) was not received. No answer was forthcoming. Meanwhile, Alexander I arrived in Vilna on 26 April with the French ambassador, General Lauriston – who had received instructions to keep negotiations open with the tsar – still in tow. By now, however, the French ambassador found his access to the Russian tsar barred.
The French imperial couple left for Dresden on 9 May, arriving there on 16 May. They would remain in the city until 29 May. On 18 May, Napoleon was joined by the Austrian emperor, Francis I.
Despite Barclay de Tolly's desire to launch some early pre-emptive offensives in East Prussia and Poland – essentially a means of spoiling French preparations – no attack orders from Alexander were forthcoming. The signature of the Franco-Austrian treaty in April, had intensified Russian fears of a fully-mobilised Austrian army marching on Russia. This development, coupled with the sheer scale of troops assembled by Napoleon meant that any plans of offensive action were abandoned.
Barclay de Tolly's plans for pre-emptive action had however left Russian troops poorly organised to resist the invasion. A quick reorganisation was required to move troops away from East Prussia and Poland and secure the most likely points of invasion along the western border, which as well as being vast also lacked any real natural defences. On 11 May, Petr Mikhailovich Volkonsky, adjutant to Alexander I, noted that the distance between the HQs of Barclay's corps (in Schawel, an important town on the Prussian-Russian border, now Šiauliai in Lithuania) and Prince Pyotr Bagration (in Lutsk, today in Ukraine) was over eight hundred kilometres.
On 28 May, Russia, eager to free up troops for the impending invasion, signed a peace treaty – the Treaty of Bucharest – with the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan found himself forced to agree peace, despite having hoped to hold out until invasion when Russian forces would be diverted elsewhere. Although Alexander was required to return Moldavia and Wallachia to the Turks, he secured in compensation territory in Besarabia and access to the Mediterranean. The Army of the Danube was also freed up to return to Russia. According to Lieven, although the troops could not have made it back in time to fight off Napoleon's initial invasion, the presence of these troops in and around Belorussia greatly hampered Napoleon's communications and retreat.
By 6 June, Pyotr Bagration had moved the reorganised Second Army up to Pruzhany in a bid to bring the first and second armies closer together in order to hold a more defensible line. On 18 June, he was ordered to move further northwards, to guard against Napoleon's push through north-east Prussia towards Vilna. Yet the ultra-defensive policy adopted by Alexander in effect left the Russians forced to wait on Napoleon's first move. Uncertainty surrounding the initial developments of the war meant that few concrete measures had been taken early on. In military terms, there was a general understanding in the Russian officer corps (at least amongst those experienced in warfare) that war was generally too unpredictable to be planned to any great detail. The magnitude of the Russian empire also meant that once Napoleon had made the initial move through the Duchy of Warsaw and crossed the Dvina, he could head off in any number of directions. He could make straight for St Petersburg, or Moscow, head south towards Ukraine and its food and horse reserves, or simply remain in Belarus and consolidate his gains.
On 22 June, as his troops prepared to invade Russian territory, Napoleon issued a proclamation to his army:
“Soldiers! The second Polish war has begun; the first ended at Friedland and Tilsit. At Tilsit, Russia swore an eternal alliance with France and war with Britain. Today she has violated these oaths! She refuses to give any explanation of her strange conduct, except on condition that the eagles of France repass the Rhine, leaving, by such a movement, our allies at her mercy. Russia is dragged along by a fate. Her destinies must be accomplished. Shall she then consider us degenerate? Are we no longer to be looked upon as the soldiers of Austerlitz? She offers us the alternative of dishonour or war. The choice should not be in doubt. Let us then march forward. Let us pass the Niemen. Let us carry the war into her territory. The second war of Poland will be as glorious to the French arms as was the first; but the peace which we shall conclude will be its own guaranty and will put an end to the fateful influence which Russia has for fifty years exercised over the affairs of Europe.”
On 24 June, Napoleon at the head of his army crossed the Prussian-Russian border near Kovno (Kaunas, modern-day Lithuania), at the river Niemen. The invading French army comprised three main groups, spread out over 650 kilometres (numbers from Thierry Lentz, Nouvelle Histoire du Premier Empire: L'effondrement du système napoléonien 1810-1814, pp. 259-267). The initial invasion force numbered about 455,000 men. On the other side was a frontline defending Russian army of about 280,000.
NAPOLEON’S RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN: FROM THE NIEMEN TO MOSCOW
Searching for the decisive encounter
As Napoleon concentrated his enormous coalition army in preparation for the invasion of Russia, three Russian armies were positioned to guard the western frontier: the 1st Western Army, under Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, the 2nd Western Army, under Prince Pyotr Bagration, and the 3rd Western Army, under Alexander Tormasov. In June 1812, the 1st Western Army was stationed along the frontier with East Prussia and the Duchy of Warsaw. The 2nd was placed further south in modern Belarus. The 3rd stood yet further south, but still in Belarus. The overall commander of these three armies was Alexander himself, who was installed in Barclay de Tolly's headquarters near Vilna.
On 23 June, the Prussian major (and later military theorist) Karl von Clausewitz, who had recently entered Alexander's service, reached the Drissa camp (northwest of Polotsk on the Dvina, near modern Verkhniadzvinsk in Belarus) to inspect the site and report on the progress being made on its defensive works and fortifications. He remained unconvinced of its defensive qualities and said so to Alexander on 28 June. Despite the fact that the camp had appeared central to Russian strategy pre-invasion, it would prove of little worth once the Russian forces had withdrawn from the western frontier.
News of the Grande Armée's advance guard crossing the Niemen (24 June, 1812) reached Alexander and Barclay de Tolly that same day, late in the evening. The order to withdraw to the Drissa camp was issued shortly afterwards, and Barclay's units fell back.
Between 26 and 27 June, the order to retreat back from borders spread to each of the Russian corps commanders. Although most of the 1st Western Army's withdrawal was relatively untroubled, General Dokhturov's 6th corps, stationed between Lida and Grodno, was almost cut off by the Grande Armée's crossing of the Niemen and Davout's troops making for Minsk. Only by force marching did the 6th corps avoid the advancing French troops and reach Drissa unmolested. It was also on 26 June that Alexander dispatched a letter proposing talks with Napoleon, provided that the French emperor retired back over the border. The messenger was held up by Davout and only succeeded in reaching Berthier and Napoleon at the end of the month. The evacuation of Vilna began late on 26 June: by the time Napoleon received Alexander's messenger and letter, Vilna had been occupied by the Grande Armée. Barclay de Tolly left the city early on 28 June, having destroyed the remaining depots as well as the bridge across the Dvina. Napoleon's advance troops arrived about an hour later.
Bagration, at the head of the 2nd Western Army, had been stationed in the triangle of Volkovysk (modern day Belarus) Białystok (modern-day Poland) and Brest-Litovsk when Napoleon crossed the Niemen. With less than 250km between the two commanders, Bagration was instructed to head back inland, and he left Volkovysk on 28 June. On 30 June, Jerome Napoleon, king of Westphalia, arrived in Grodno (modern-day Belarus), about 50 km to the north of Volkovysk so recently vacated by the Russians. However Jerome's slow advance at the head of his Westphalian troops was not speedy enough for his infuriated brother, Napoleon. The emperor wanted Jerome to push on and harry Bagration's force before it had a chance to withdraw and join up with the 1st Western Army. Whilst Bagration had initially been instructed to head straight for the Drissa camp, on learning of Davout's position further north – near Achmiany (Belarus), heading for Minsk – which rendered his instructions impossible, the Russian instead set off due east for Bobruysk, also heading towards Minsk. Jerome's advance troops eventually made contact with Bagration's strong rearguard cavalry further down the line, but by then it was too late: Bagration had escaped Jerome and Davout and was able to continue his reluctant retreat.
By 4 July, the Austrian headquarters, commanded by Prince Schwarzenberg, had moved up from Lviv and was by now in Pruzhany (modern-day Belarus). His orders were to monitor Tormasov's forces stationed on Alexander's far left wing, in the Volynia region (modern-day north-western Ukraine, around Lutsk and Rivne).
To Drissa via Saltanovka
By 5 July, Jerome had still not made any serious advance on Bagration. On 6 July, Napoleon gave orders that in the event of Jerome's and Davout's troops reuniting, overall command would devolve to Davout as the more experienced general. He also instructed his stepson and Viceroy of Italy, Eugene de Beauharnais to lead his IV, the VI corps and the III cavalry corps to get after Bagration in support of Davout. The viceroy left Novo Troki (modern-day Trakai, Lithuania) on 7 July and headed south for Šalčininkai (Lithuania). On 8 July, Davout and his 1st Corps occupied Minsk.
The advance guard of the 1st Western Army, with Alexander, arrived at the fortified camp in Drissa on 9 July, followed two days later by Barclay de Tolly with the main body of the 1st Western Army. Yet by 17 July, the Russians were leaving the camp, having burned their remaining stores. Pursuing a policy of scorched earth and a total avoidance of open battle with Napoleon, the forces retreated back on Vitebsk.
At the start of the campaign, General Matvei Platov's flying cossacks offered cover for Bagration's retreating force. With Jerome's troops desperately trailing after the retreating 2nd Western Army, Platov's cossacks ambushed Jerome's advanced Polish lancers on 8, 9 and 10 July, near the villages of Kareličy and Mir (Belarus). These clashes were the first real combat of the campaign, and saw the Polish troops defeated, and indeed nearly routed, by the superior cossack light cavalry. These defeats ensured that a healthy distance remained between Jerome and Bagration's retreating forces.
Finally, on 11 July Jerome's two corps reached Navahrudak (Belarus) and continued east, reaching Nesvizh on 14 July. It was there that, on 16 July, he received Davout who informed him of Napoleon's decision to amalgamate the forces and remove his younger brother from command. Furious, Jerome set off home to Kassel (back in Westphalia). Meanwhile, Bagration had reached Slutsk by 13 July, by now beyond the reaches of both Jerome and Davout. Davout's presence did however prevent Bagration from immediately linking up with Barclay de Tolly at the Drissa camp. Forced to circle further to the south in order to stay out of Davout's reaches, Bagration eventually met Davout later that month, at the Battle of Saltanovka (23 July).
Meanwhile, Napoleon remained in Vilna until 16 July, occupied with a number of important tasks. One was the organisation of the government of Lithuania. On 1 July, 1812, Napoleon had signed a text establishing the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (also known as the Provisional Government of Lithuania): the initial aim was to raise troops in the Lithuanian territories and provision the rearguard of the Grande Armée. Despite putting in place an extensive system of government and administration (he appointed diplomat Louis Pierre Edouard Bignon as imperial commissar and Dutch general Dirk van Hogendorp as governor), logistical difficulties and lack of material support beset the provisional government. Another key operation was the organisation of his supply line: a great deal of food and water provisions for the entire campaign had to come through Vilna. In the end, however, the three or so weeks that Napoleon spent in Vilna slowed the advance to such an extent that both Bagration and Barclay de Tolly were able to retreat back into Russia relatively unhindered.
Morale had however suffered greatly in the Russian camp in the early days of the campaign. In fact even the initial strategic withdrawal had proved extremely unpopular with a number of the tsar's generals, who considered it not only militarily risky to cede ground so easily but also politically dangerous to abandon the Duchy of Warsaw and Prussia to Napoleon. Russian despondency surrounding this initial retreat was palpable. On 10 July, 1812, the Russian officer Arseny Andreyevich Zakrevsky (who had served as adjutant to Barclay de Tolly earlier in 1812) wrote to Fieldmarshal Vorontsov with criticism for the strategy:
“We have retired hastily, towards the wretched position of Drissa which, it would seem, will be our ruin. We cannot now reassess our decision, or undertake a different strategy; it appears that we have chosen the worst.”
And as time passed, the Drissa camp too began to appear unable to offer the protection required against Napoleon's advancing Grande Armée. If Barclay de Tolly remained entrenched in the camp, Napoleon would be at liberty to direct his forces against Bagration and destroy the 2nd Western Army. Such an event would open up the Grande Armée's march on Moscow and leave Barclay de Tolly dangerously exposed and threatened from behind.
And so, on 17 July, in another morale-sapping manouvre, Russian forces destroyed the camp's magazines and marched out south east, away from the border and towards Vitebsk. What had initially been been built as the bedrock on which the entire Russian defensive strategy was to be abandoned only three weeks after the invasion. Peter Wittgenstein was to remain in the area with 25,000 men (the 1st Infantry Corps) and orders to protect the road to St Petersburg. On 18 July, having arrived in Polotsk, Alexander left his army in the hands of Barclay de Tolly and proceeded on to Moscow, before returning to St Petersburg. The Russian strategy appeared to be in tatters. On the same day (18 July), Napoleon arrived in Hlybokaye (modern-day Belarus), 86km to the south-west of Polotsk. Oudinot was by now just below the Drissa camp.
From Saltanovka towards Smolensk
Further to the south-east, at 7am on 23 July, General Rayevski's 7th Corps (part of Bagration's 2nd Western Army) met Davout's infantry forces – commanded by Joseph-Marie Dessaix , Compans and Claparède – and his cavalry squadrons at Saltanovka, just south of Mogilev. The French forces outnumbered Rayevski's troops, and the Russian troops – instructed to force their way through to Mogilev – failed to make any headway. Rayevski's attack did however buy enough time for the remaining troops of the 2nd Western Army to head north-east for Smolensk. Russian losses numbered about 2,500, whilst the Grande Armée saw over a thousand soldiers injured, killed or taken prisoner. And although Davout had prevented Bagration's force from reaching Barclay de Tolly, thus forcing him westwards, catching up with the Russians remained beyond the Grande Armée. Davout's aggressive march to cut off Bagration had also severely depleted his troops. Following his victory at Saltanovka, the marshal was obliged to halt at Mogilev and let the Russians withdraw.
On 24 July, Napoleon had reached Kamień, about 95km due west of Vitebsk. Oudinot was based near Dzisna, keeping an eye on Wittgenstein (who was based at the Drissa camp) but prepared to cross the river Dvina if necessary. The 1st Western Army had marched hard, with some of its forces reaching Vitebsk by 23 July. Barclay de Tolly still hoped to link up with Bagration but, aware that Napoleon was looking to force an engagement at Vitebsk, he dispatched Alexander Ivanovich Ostermann-Tolstoy, commander of the 1st Western Army's 4th Corps, back to Ostrovno to create a screen and slow the Grande Armée's advance.
On 25 July, Murat came across Ostermann-Tolstoy's forces stationed in a defensible position near the river Dvina and the modern-day village of Astroüna (Ostrovno) at what was the first major clash between Napoleon forces and the 1st Western Army. As a result of Ostermann-Tolstoy's limited qualities as a general, the French ambush succeeded in capturing a number of the 4th Corps' guns. And a rash Russian infantry charge (not this time the general's fault) was initially successful but eventually overwhelmed, losing 30% of its men. With an additional French division under Alexis Joseph Delzon advancing on the position, Ostermann-Tolstoy retreated back towards Kakuviachino. Although losses were high (about 2,500 killed, wounded or missing), the 4th Corps had succeeded in slowing down the French advance. The task of delaying the Murat's troops further was handed over to Peter Konovnitsyn, commander in the 3rd Corps. The latter and his troops managed to hold the French off for another day until on 26 July. When however Barclay de Tolly learned that Bagration had been held at Mogilev and was not going to make Vitebsk, possibilities of facing Napoleon at Vitebsk were severely compromised. Russian generals, notably Ermolov, managed then to pursuade Barclay de Tolly that holding the position at Vitebsk risked being outnumbered by the advancing Grande Armée, and there was still the possibility that the 1st and 2nd Western Armies could become cut off from one another. At 4pm on 27 July, the First Western Army's retreat from Vitebsk began east in direction of Smolensk. With Peter Pahlen, in charge of the rearguard, holding the French at bay and covering the Russian troops' tracks, the 1st Western Army again succeeded in slipping away from Napoleon. The deft withdrawal, which left nothing to the French forces when they arrived in Vitebsk on 28 July, was a clear sign to some of the Grande Armée's officers that the Russian forces in front of them were not going to be a pushover. By this point, Napoleon needed to give his troops a rest and Barclay de Tolly's men were able to make their way on to Smolensk, arriving there on 1 August.
On 2 August, Bagration's 2nd Western Army and Barclay de Tolly's 1st Western Army finally convened in Smolensk.
Having arrived in Vitebsk on 28 July, Napoleon decided to offer his troops some much needed rest. The march, coupled with the heat (the daily temperature was by averaging 28-30° C), meant his troops could not continue any serious pursuit of Barclay de Tolly. That night, the French emperor declared to Murat, Berthier and Eugène that “The first Russian campaign is over… We shall be in Moscow in 1813, [and] in St Petersburg in 1814. The war with Russia is a three-year war.”
On 4 August, the French headquarters was thus in Vitebsk, with Eugene in Surazh (between Velizh, Russia, to the north-east and Janavičy to the south-west in modern-day Ukraine); Murat at Rudnya (just over the border in modern-day Russia, on the road between Vitebsk and Smolensk); Davout at the confluence of the Beresina and the Dnieper; Ney south-east of Vitebsk, at Liozna (Belarus); Junot in Orcha (Belarus); Poniatowski in Mogilev; Oudinot before Polotsk; and Schwarzenberg in Slonim (Belarus).
Polotsk, Smolensk and on to Borodino
To the north, on the French left flank, Oudinot had been charged with linking up with Etienne-Jacques-Joseph-Alexandre Macdonald – leading the 10th Corps and himself ordered to capture the stronghold of Riga – and pushing back Wittgenstein. Although Oudinot never succeeded in joining up with Macdonald, he did engage Wittgenstein between 30 July and 1 August. The first battle actually took place on 28 July, between Wittgenstein's advance guard (under General Kulniev) and Oudinot's light cavalry and the 6th infantry division, commanded by Corbineau and Legrand respectively, at Kliastitsy (35km north of Polotsk). This initial clash saw the French surprised and pushed back: the second meeting, which ran over 30 July, 31 July and 1 August, saw further French losses as the Russian artillery held the advance. Kulniev was however killed leading a charge late on 1 August, the Russians lost about one thousand men, and the battle came to an end with Oudinot withdrawing south towards Polotsk and Wittgenstein falling back northwards. As a result, Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, who commanded the Bavarian VI Corps and had already been instructed to offer Oudinot support, was obliged to force march from Biešankovičy (about 80km south-east of Polotsk) to Polotsk. Setting out on 4 August, the Bavarian corps reached Polotsk on 7 August. That same day, Oudinot set out from Polotsk, heading towards Wittgenstein's position at a village called Rosiza, north of the Drissa camp. On 11 August, the Russian commander headed south towards Svol'na (Belarus), intent on cutting Oudinot off. The latter retreated back towards Polotsk. For the memoirs of D'Aupias which recount in detail this northern theatre, see here (text in French).
By now, Alexander was aware that it was becoming politically dangerous to cede such huge swathes of Russian territory without a fight. He therefore wrote to Barclay de Tolly on 9 August indicating the need to go on the offensive and begin fighting back properly against the invaders. Despite the push from both within and without the army to attack Napoleon in open battle, Barclay de Tolly remained unconvinced. Arguing that pitched battle against the Grande Armée risked leaving the Russian empire completely undefended should he prove unsuccessful, Barclay de Tolly continued to pursue his defensive retreat, hoping that slowing Napoleon would allow Alexander time to put together a reserve force.
Further south, in Gorodeczna (north-east of Brest-Litovsk, between Pruzhany and Kobrin), on 12 August troops under Schwarzenberg and Reynier defeated a Russian force commanded by Tormassov.
On the afternoon of 15 August, troops under Murat and Ney arrived at the western edge of Smolensk, where elements of the 1st and 2nd Western Armies had convened (including Dokhturov's VII Corps, infantry from Konovnitzin's II Corps and Neverovsky's 27th Division). Over the course of 16 and 17 August, Ney's and Murat's troops, along with Poniatowski's Polish Corps, clashed with the Russians pitched in Smolensk: Barclay de Tolly – who was resolved to continue the retreat and draw Napoleon ever eastwards – called a withdrawal. About 11,000 Russians died defending the city.
Back in the north west, the First Battle of Polotsk took place between 17 and 18 August and saw Oudinot's troops, supported by Gouvion-St-Cyr's Bavarians, meet Wittgenstein's reinforced 1st Corps of about 22,000 men. The Russian attack centred on the village of Spas (near Polotsk) but by the end of the first day, both sides had maintained their positions. Oudinot was wounded during the day, and Gouvion-St-Cyr took over the command. On 18 August, a French counter attack was launched and succeeded in pushing Wittgenstein back, who decided that withdrawal was the best course of action. Although the Russians had withdrawn (Gouvion-St-Cyr was made a maréchal shortly afterwards, on 27 August, 1812), Oudinot's march on St Petersburg was held up. The latter came in for some severe criticism from Napoleon, who considered that Oudinot had allowed himself to be cowed and bullied by Wittgenstein. Alexander, for his part, would later declare Wittgenstein to be the “saviour of St Petersburg” whilst Gouvion-St-Cyr praised the Russians for their orderly and combative retreat. The Russian troops fell back to Sivoshin, 40km or so from Potolsk, and there was to be no further combat until October.
The 1st and 2nd Western Armies' march back in the direction of Moscow was to prove eventful. Having evacuated Smolensk (which was by now in ruins), and forced along poor country roads in order to avoid the French artillery, Barclay de Tolly's rearguard – commanded by Eugen of Württemberg, Alexander's cousin – was severely harried by Napoleon's advancing troops, commanded by Ney and Murat. The retreat had begun in confusion and a complete lack of coordination, caused in part by poor organisation, difficult roads, and a night-time departure. As a result, Württemberg's troops were caught by Ney's advancing force. Meanwhile, troops under Pavel Tuchkov (who was later captured during the combat and imprisoned), held their nerve and succeeded in protecting the Moscow road to the east of Smolensk. These skirmishes, which took place on 19 August near Valutino and Gedeonovo (on the outskirts of Smolensk, near modern-day Lubino), are often claimed as French victories. Although the Russians were forced to withdraw, the advancing troops under Ney and Murat were held up long enough to allow the Russians to retreat to a safe distance. Napoleon, who believed the Russians to have retreated further back than they in actual fact had, remained away from the frontline, installed in Smolensk since 16 August. In the end, the lack of concerted push from the French saved the Russian army. Smolensk had been left to the French, but Napoleon knew that Moscow would not be abandoned without a serious fight.
On 18 August, Kutusov was appointed supreme commander, replacing Barclay de Tolly, whose tactics had been widely criticised, particularly by Bagration. Barclay de Tolly remained in command of the 1st Western Army, but Kutusov now dictated the strategy. Since the retreat from Smolensk, a defensible position for battle with Napoleon had been sought somewhere along the Moscow road. Dorogobuzh and the nearby Usv'atye fields (the site of Colonel Toll's open criticism of Barclay de Tolly's strategy, an incident on 21 August known as the “Mutiny of the Generals”) were both suggested and rejected. Time was running out as the Russian forces retreated back towards Moscow. Eventually, the small village of Borodino, 124 kilometres from Moscow was chosen.
On 25 August, Napoleon – based near Dorogobuzh (about ninety kilometres east of Smolensk) – received the wounded Tuchkov, where he proposed peace talks. Tuchkov refused and later that autumn was dispatched to Metz. By 28 August, the Grande Armée had arrived in the town of Vyaz'ma, 114km from Borodino. The retreating Russian troops had sought to raze it to the ground, but the French forces succeeded in extinguishing the fire and salvaging the town's food stores. On 29 August, Kutusov joined up with the retreating Russian forces on the Moscow road.
On 30 August, 2,000 reinforcements under General Miloradovich arrived, and at the start of September, the Russians were in Borodino. On 31 August, two cossacks were captured by Murat's forces: Napoleon subsequently learned of Kutuzov's promotion and arrival as commander of the Russian forces. On 1 September, Napoleon arrived in Gjatsk (modern-day Gagarin, Russia), just sixty or so kilometres from Borodino.
The run-up to Borodino
Despite being chosen as the site to pitch battle, Borodino was not without its faults. The Old Smolensk Road, which cut in from the west behind the Russian position (the latter running from Maslovo, through Borodino and the destroyed village of Semenovskoe – Raevski's Redoubt – and onto the Russian left-flank stationed at Shevardino), offered the advancing Grande Armée a route behind Russian lines. To avoid this, Bagration's troops, stationed at Shevardino, started to push south eastwards to Utitsa, due south of Borodino.
On 5 September, the French advance guard under Murat appeared on the Russian left-wing near Shevardino, commanded by Major General Count Sievers. Murat, with Davout, captured the villages of Alexinki and Kolotsa, near Shevardino. Meanwhile Poniatowski moved up from the south and captured Doronino. During the fierce battle, the Russians lost between 5,000 and 6,000 men and were pushed back. French losses totalled about 4,000. As a result, a large majority of the Russian forces stationed at Borodino were squeezed into the small area of land between Semenovskoe and Borodino.
The morning of 5 September, French forces totalled slightly more than 140,000 men (of which Napoleon would commit 124,000, refusing to commit his elite Guards regiment), with the Russian troops at about 110,000. On 6 September, the two sides recuperated from the previous day's battle and made preparations for the next clash.
The night before the battle, Kutuzov roused his troops, declaring:
“Companions,
Fulfil your duty. Think of the sacrifices made of your cities delivered to the flames and of your children who implore your protection. Think of your emperor, your lord, who considers you to be the source of his strength, and tomorrow, before the sun has gone down, you will have written your faith and your loyalty to your sovereign and your fatherland in the blood of the aggressor and his armies.” (Quoted in French in Marie-Pierre Rey, L'Effroyable Tragédie, 2012, p. 155)
“Compagnons,
Remplissez votre devoir. Songez aux sacrifices de vos cités livrées aux flammes et à vos enfants qui implorent votre protection. Songez à votre Empereur, votre Seigneur, qui vous considère comme le nerf de sa force, et demain, avant que le soleil ne se couche, vous aurez écrit votre foi et votre fidélité à votre souverain et à votre patrie avec le sang de l'agresseur et de ses armées.”
At 2am on 7 September, Napoleon dictated his famous proclamation, to be read to the troops at about 6am:
“Soldiers! Here is the battle that you have so much desired. From now on victory depends on you: it is necessary to us. It will give you abundance, good winter quarters, and a prompt return to the fatherland. Conduct yourselves as at Austerlitz, at Friedland, at Vitebsk, at Smolensk, and let the most distant posterity point with pride to your conduct on this day. Let it be said of you, 'He was in that great battle under the walls of Moscow.'”
“Soldats ! Vous avez supporté les privations et les fatigues avec autant de courage que vous avez montré d'intrépidité et de sang-froid au milieu des combats. Vous êtes les dignes défenseurs de l'honneur de ma couronne et de la gloire du grand peuple. Tant que vous serez animés de cet esprit, rien ne pourra vous résister.
Soldats, voilà la bataille que vous avez tant désirée ! Désormais la victoire dépend de vous : elle nous est nécessaire. Elle nous donnera l'abondance, de bons quartiers d'hiver et un prompt retour dans la patrie ! Conduisez-vous comme à Austerlitz, à Friedland, à Vitebsk, à Smolensk, et que la postérité la plus reculée cite avec orgueil votre conduite dans cette journée ; que l'on dise de vous : il était à cette grande bataille sous les murs de Moscou !”
The Battle of Borodino
On 7 September, at the Battle of Borodino, the Russians sought to fight a battle of attrition. Knowing that they were clustered densely around the defensive positions erected in the area (Raevski's Redoubt and the v-shaped earthworks known as the Bagration flèches), the hope was that Napoleon would be limited tactically and forced to simply meet the Russians head-on. The Russian command knew that this strategy would cost them a great deal of men. The massed ranks of Russian troops formed a thick curtain of troops, whilst the battlefield and troop arrangement made any military manoeuvres almost impossible. The battle has gone down in history not for its strategic brilliance but for the sheer destruction of life on both sides. After the battle, General Lariboisière estimated that the French artillery – all 587 guns – had fired about 60,000 times, with the infantry having gone through 140,000 cartridges: it is thought that the Russians fired slightly fewer cannon shots (50,000) and 20,000 fewer cartridges. For a battle that lasted about ten hours, this works out at about three cannon shots per second and more than 430 musket shots per minute (figures in Marie-Pierre Rey, L'Effroyable Tragédie, 2012, pp. 156-157). The Russian artillery numbered over 600 pieces, but problems in supplying enough ammunition coupled with a failure to concentrate their fire where it mattered meant that they proved less effective than the French guns. The Russians also lost Aleksandr Kutaisov, the artillery commander: his body was never found.
One Russian officer, Lieutenant Andreev, noted in reference to the cannon fire:
“They said that the sky burned [that day]. But we could barely make out the sky through the screen of smoke.”
At 6.30am, the French forces hit the right-wing of the Russian army, surprising Kutuzov, who expected the first hit to come against the left-wing. Troops commanded by Eugène and led by General Delzons crashed out of the dawn fog and into the Russian forces stationed in Borodino. After a brief counter-attack around 7am, the village fell. At the same time, troops under Davout and Ney attacked the southern-most Bagration flèches, guarded by men under General Mikhail Vorontsov and Neverovsky. The defensive works exchanged hands in the three hours up to 10am, when Ney finally seized them back for the French. By midday, the French troops had fought off the Russian counter-attacks and secured the position. The day was to get worse for the Russians: Bagration was gravely wounded during the battle and had passed out. He would eventually die from the related infection on 24 September. The central redoubt was the site of particularly bloody fighting, captured and lost in turn – swinging like a “pendulum” in the words of Dominic Lieven Russia against Napoleon (p. 201) – as both sides manoeuvred to secure the position. During the fighting, Montbrun died after shrapnel ripped through his kidney, whilst his replacement in the struggle for the redoubt, General Auguste de Caulaincourt (brother of the diplomat), was also killed.
Finally, around 6pm, the cannon fire stopped and the two sides retired to their headquarters: Napoleon to Shevardino, Kutuzov to Moshaysk, 15km to the east. Although Napoleon anticipated picking up where he had left off the next morning, in reality the battle was over. The battle was to prove one of the bloodiest in the entire history of the Napoleonic Wars: the Russians had 45,000 dead, wounded or missing, whilst Napoleon's losses totalled between 28,000 and 35,000. Dominique Jean Larrey, chief surgeon, estimated that he had performed about two hundred amputations – most as a result of artillery fire – in the first twenty-four hours after the battle. The victory – in terms of territory won and losses inflicted – was Napoleon's. It was not to be however the decisive one he so craved: the remnants of the Russian armies retreated back towards Moscow, leading Napoleon to declare “La paix est à Moscou”. In relaying the result of the battle to Alexander, Kutuzov's description painted it as a victory to the Russians. Later Russian army bulletins even described how the French army had been torn to pieces, albeit without any mention of the death toll. Debate remains as to whether the victory could have been the one Napoleon wanted had he committed his Guards. His officer corps had been divided on the issue during the battle – Murat, Davout and Ney for their introduction in order to bring the battle to its conclusion; Berthier, Duroc and Bessières against, for fear that a damaged Guards regiment would affect morale so far from Paris – and historians have continued to debate how successful their introduction would have been. As it was, the Guards remained in reserve, Kutuzov retreated down the Moscow road, and Napoleon found himself obliged to give chase once again.
To Moscow
This time, the Russian withdrawal was less organised. The retreat, covered by the cossack commander Matvei Platov, proved ineffective in slowing up the French chase. As a result, on 10 September the Russian rearguard clashed with Murat's vanguard. The Russian troops, unable to retreat in good order, were forced to leave many of their wounded and sick in Moshaysk. Napoleon remained in Moshaysk until 12 September.
The problem of Moscow reared its head again: no longer a question of pitching battle en route, the Russian forces headed back to the capital of Old Russia.
Kutuzov was far more attached to Moscow than Barclay de Tolly was (as a Baltic Protestant, Barclay de Tolly's allegiance lay primarily with the tsar and the empire, rather than the city of Moscow) and initially saw its loss as the end for Russia. However the previous battle had convinced him that the Russian army needed time and space to recover. A further engagement so soon after Borodino was not high on his list of priorities. At 4pm on 13 September, the day after the Russian army had arrived in Fili (a small village on the western outskirts of Moscow), a council of war was held. There, it was made clear that any attempt to hold the city would result in the destruction of the Russian army, the fall of Moscow and the likely end of the Russian Empire. Kutuzov may have come to that decision already, but as Lieven points out, the agreement (or at the very least a shared blame) had to be reached before he could call the retreat. In attendance were Bennigsen and Barclay de Tolly. Bennigsen was charged with preparing and choosing the battleground for the defence of the city, and he made it clear in later correspondence that he saw Barclay de Tolly and Kutuzov as the culprits behind the decision. Barclay de Tolly supported Kutuzov in his argument: not only would a defeat in front of the gates of Moscow have lost the city, but any subsequent retreat would be severely hampered by having to withdraw – probably hastily – through Moscow. At the end of the meeting, Kutuzov declared:
“I know that I am going to have for the breakage, but I sacrifice myself for the good of the fatherland. I order the retreat.” (quoted in Marie-Pierre Rey, op. cit., 2012, pp. 168-169)
By the evening of 13 September, the decision had been announced. Despair, shame and anger swept through the army (to be replaced by grim resolve), whilst fear took hold of the civilians all too aware of the Grande Armée's imminent arrival. Although some inhabitants had started to leave the city before the decision had gone public, there was little time to complete a full civilian evacuation. Archives were hurriedly boxed up, treasures covered, hidden or dispatched from the city. Carriages and carts were requisitioned for transport. At 11pm, the artillery began moving out of the city. The infantry began a few hours later, at 3am on 14 September. That day, as the Russian army passed through, the city descended into absolute chaos. As early as 3 September, however, Fyodor Rostopchin, the governor of Moscow, had begun removing not only all inhabitants considered “foreign” enough to harbour pro-French or pro-Napoleon sympathies (including Germans, Swiss and French) but also all civil servants and local elites, intent as he was to deprive Napoleon of any opportunity to liaise with or develop a relationship with the Russian authorities.
As Napoleon's advance guard under Murat approached the city walls, the Russian general in charge of covering the Russian retreat was a certain Mikhail Miloradovich, who succeeded in securing a one-day truce in order to evacuate the army in good order. Murat obliged, and the Russians were able to withdraw unmolested. Murat's troops did not reach the Dorogomilovo District, in the west, until 2pm on 14 September.
The night of 13/14 September, Rostopchin also evacuated the 2000-odd members of the fire brigade and nearly one hundred water pumps from the city. What followed remains uncertain. There is evidence to suggest that Rostopchin gave the order to set fire to the city once the army had left. It may have also been part of the general scorched earth policy of the Russian army ever since the Grande Armée had crossed the border. It equally could have been brought about from looting on both sides. All that is known is that no orders for such an act were given by Napoleon or Alexander (irrespective – in the case of the former – of later Russian propaganda). Whatever the case, early on 15 September Napoleon entered an almost completely deserted Moscow. The population, about 262,000 in 1812, had left, with only 10,000 (some of whom were wounded soldiers) remaining. By midday he had set up his headquarters in the Kremlin. The nature of the evacuation had left a large quantity of food and drink in the city. Yet by the end of the day, the first fires had broken out within the city walls. Between 10.30pm and midnight, the fire spread further, leaping quickly between the closely-packed buildings and warehouses. As the wind picked up, controlling the fire became more and more difficult. By the morning of 16 September, the fire had intensified. The Arbat – the historical centre of the city – was destroyed and the University of Moscow's library had gone up in flames. At midday that day, Napoleon was encouraged to evacuate the Kremlin. Refusing, he remained in the palace until 5.30pm when, “besieged by an ocean of flames” (in Ségur's words), he was obliged to flee.
He and his officers set up camp in the Petrovski Palace, a few kilometres north-west of Moscow, on the St Petersburg road. The remaining French troops, being completely without the means to bring the fire under control, left the city at the same time. Eugene de Beauharnais lead his troops out on the road to Zvenigorod (to the west). Ney headed north-west towards St Petersburg. Davout took the road to Smolensk. The French forces remained outside of the city limits until 20 September when, as the rain came to fall, the fire was extinguished. Returning to the city that day, the army – officer and common soldier alike – descended into a frenzy of pillage. In the absence of police or any sort of authority, many Russians still in the city joined in. Napoleon returned to the Kremlin. A third of Moscow's houses were utterly destroyed, whilst only 122 out of 329 churches remained standing after the fire and destruction.
Meanwhile, Kutuzov and the army had evacuated the city on 13/14 September. Initially heading out towards Ryazin', they had passed through Lyubertsy on 16 September and continued south-east. Then, Kutuzov suddenly turned west and passed back in front of Moscow at high speed. Fortunately for the Russians, the Grande Armée was to prove too exhausted to follow the withdrawal. On 18 September Kutuzov was in Podolsk, before continuing on to his encampment near Tarutino, about 100km to the south-west of Moscow. This position not only allowed him to harass the French lines of communication, but also stay in contact with the Russian forces under Tormasov and Chichagov, commander of the Army of the Danube. He was also well placed to watch over the workshops and arms factories in nearby Tula and Briansk, and receive supplies which came up to Kaluga from the fertile lands to the south, in modern-day Ukraine.
Napoleon was left with a few choices. He could make his winter quarters in the ravaged city of Moscow. He could head south towards the breadbasket of The Ukraine. Or he could make for St Petersburg. This latter option would have been feasible had he the men and the material, but as it was, he would be forced to march through the winter-ravaged land with the possibility of being cut off by the remaining troops under Kutuzov. Napoleon however seemed convinced that an approach to treat from Alexander was imminent. Nor was a great deal of coordinated effort made to organise winter equipment and supplies. Napoleon, by various means, sought to engage Alexander, but each one remained ignored.
On 20 September, Napoleon wrote to Alexander:
“The beautiful and fine city of Moscow is no more: Rostopchin has had it burnt down. Four hundred arsonists have been caught in the act; they all declared that they were lighting the fire on the order of this governor and the director of police: they have all been shot. The fire now seems to have abated. Three-quarters of the houses have been burnt, one quarter remains. […] How is it possible to destroy one of the most beautiful cities in the world and the work of centuries in the achievement of such a weak aim? […] The fire has opened the way to pillage, in which the soldiery is competing with the fire for the remains. If I once for a moment imagined that such things had been done on Your Majesty's order, I would not be writing this letter; however I am convinced that it is impossible, given your principles, your spirit and your enlightened ideas, that you ordered such excesses, unworthy as they would be of so great a sovereign and so great a nation. […] I made war against your majesty without bitterness; one word from you, whether before or after our recent battle, would have stopped my advance and I would even have agreed to forgo the advantage of entering Moscow.” [20 September, 1812, Correspondance générale, Fayard/Fondation Napoléon, 2012, n° 31,736, p. 1,103]
Upon learning of Kutuzov's movements, he dispatched Bessières to observe the Russian movements. Poniatowski and his force reached Podolsk on 24 September.
By 4 October, Napoleon knew that a decision had to be taken. Macdonald's siege of Riga was threatened by the arrival of Governor of Finland Faddey Steingell at the head of 10,000 men. Although Macdonald successfully repelled the threat, Steingell linked up with Wittgenstein, still in the area. To the south-west, Chichagov and Tormasov threatened Schwarzenberg, based near Brest-Litovsk. There were over nine hundred kilometres between Riga and Moscow, and more than a thousand kilometres between Napoleon and Brest-Litovsk. Any further advance would simply increase these distances.
In the end, Napoleon was to stay in the Moscow about a month. What was the plan there? The mounting of an attack on St Petersburg was apparently mooted; huge amounts of stores were amassed with the idea of wintering in the Russian capital; reinforcements were on their way from Smolensk. But the situation in Moscow was not good. The city was half burnt and the troops had plundered much. And not far to the south east, the Russian army, by no means out of action, was preparing to counterattack. Furthermore, partisan units were successfully harrying transport columns, and, as the encounter at Taroutino would show, despite their chaotic approach, the Russians were still a force to be reckoned with. Kutuzov was later to boast that he had played the French emperor, dragging out negotiations with Napoleon because the Russian knew that the French in Moscow were stuck in a trap.
It is possible however that, taking into account the fact that he said this in December 1812, this assertion was made with the benefit of hindsight. And in the same conversation, Kutusov also convincingly remarks that he thought that Napoleon had waited too long, letting himself be obsessed with obtaining a peace treaty instead of continuing to be belligerent. Be that as it may, Napoleon's actions in Moscow seem to imply hesitation, and in the mental and strategic void, the emperor took the fateful step of heading, too late, back west.
For a link to Part I of this timelines, click here.
