شلم . [ ش ِ ل ِ / ش ِ ] (اِ) صمغ و انگوم درخت . (ناظم الاطباء). به نظر من به فتح اول و دوم است ، زیرا دهی است بدین نام که صمغ کتیرای فراوان دارد و آن را شلم زارنامند. (یادداشت مؤلف ). بمعنی صمغ است خواه صمغ عربی باشد و خواه غیر عربی . (از برهان ) (از آنندراج ). صمغ. (ریاض الادویة) (از فرهنگ جهانگیری ): نکعة؛ شلم فتاد. (منتهی الارب ). ایدع ؛ شلمی است سرخ که از سقطری آرند و در تداوی جراحات بکار برند. (منتهی الارب ).

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 شلمزار از روستاهای شهرستان ساوجبلاغ در استان البرز است. این روستا در شمال غربی شهرستانساوجبلاغ واقع است. دو راه ارتباطی به پایتخت کشور دارد؛ جادهٔ بین‌المللی تهران-قزوین و اتوبان تهران-قزوین.^[۲] این روستا در انتهای مسیر منتهی شده از شهر‌ک هیو به آنجا قرار دارد و به این معنا است که پس از این روستا، روستای دیگری وجود ندارد.

مسیر کوهستانی منطقهٔ زیارتی و گردش‌گری سیراب از انتهای این روستا شروع می‌شود، که در گذشته محل زندگی اهالی شهرک هیو بوده منطقهٔ نام برده فاقد باغ‌های خصوصی بوده ولی جزء زمین‌های هیو می‌باشد.

در شمال این روستا خط لوله‌ای واقع شده که از سد طالقان به سوی تهران کشیده شده. لازم است ذکر شود که این خط لوله علاوه بر شلمزار از بخشی از زمین‌های هیو، از حدود یک و نیم کیلومتری شمال عرب آباد (روستایی در شرق شلمزار)، تقریباً مماس با خور (روستایی در شرق عرب آباد) و نواحی جنوبی فشند نیز عبور می‌کند.

این چهار روستای نام برده هر سه به زبان ترکی صحبت می‌کنند ولی هر یک با گویشی کاملاً متفاوت، جالب این است که در روستاهای بالاتر از اتوبان، مناطق کاملاً آذری زبان محدود به همین چهار روستا بوده و سایر روستاهایی که موقعیتی مشابه این چهار روستا دارند همگی فارسی زبان و با اصالت طالقانی می‌باشند.

در گذشته مردم این روستا به دامداری و باغ داری و بیش از همه به کشاورزی می‌پرداختند. در فصولی هم که کار کشاورزی آنچنان رونقی نداشته یعنی در فصول سرد، مردم به کار در معادن اطراف می‌پرداختند.

داد و ستد مردم این روستا علاوه بر روستاهای مجاور، با برخی از روستاهای طالقان نیز بوده است.

در این روستا چندین درخت چنار وجود دارد که کهن‌ترین آن حدود 500 سال تخمین زده می‌شود.

وجه تسمیه

شلم در دائرةالمعارف علی اکبر دهخدا به معنی کتیرا می‌باشد و لذا شلمزار به معنی کتیرا زار یعنی جایی که کتیرا در آن بسیار می‌روید می باشد اکنون نیز گیاه کتیرا در کوه‌های اطراف وجود دارد. البته وجه تسمیه‌های دیگری نیز بیان شده که سندیت محکمی ندارد از قبیل شالم زر یعنی کسی که شالی از طلا دارد این حاکی از حکایتی است که دریکی از کتب ارامنه ساکن شلمزار قدیم نوشته شده که بیان کننده داستانی از نبرد پهلوان شاه عباس با یک مرد تنومند و قوی از ارامنه شلمزار بوده است و دیگر آنکه برخی گفته‌اند شلمزار به معنای دشتی است که در آن شلم (گیاهی از خانواده کتیرا) می‌روییده و برخی گفته‌اند شلم با ضمه تلفظ شده و به معنای محلی بوده که پس از بارندگی همراه با گل و شل می‌شده‌است. در گذشته گویا از اصفهان هر ساله مردمی می‌امدند و در بخش جنوبی روستا ( الّرْبولاغی ) کتیرا برداشت می‌کردند. این موضوع احتمال داستان کتیرا را در نام‌گذاری این روستا قوت می‌بخشد.

جاذبه‌ها

این روستا جمعیتی نزدیک به ۱۶۰۰ نفر دارد از مکانهای تفریحی آن می‌توان به باغ‌های روستا در بخش مرکزی آن اشاره کرد. روستا دارای دو تپه و یک دره است که اغلب باغها در بخش درهٔ این روستا قرار دارند و البته بجز آن مردم این روستا در خارج از آنجا هم باغهایی دارند که از آن میان می‌توان به باغ‌های شاه توت که در قسمت شمال روستا واقع شده است (به دلیل وجود این درختان این مکان را به نام شاه‌توت نامگذاری کرده‌اند که امروزه بخش کوچکی از آن درختان باقی مانده) و در شرق روستا هم می‌توان باغ‌های انگور بوته (باغ انگور یا به بیان محلی‌ها اَنگَرْتِ) نیز اشاره کرد که از مکانهای جذاب و پر طرفدار این روستا می‌باشد. از جمله زلال‌ترین چشمه‌ها می‌توان به کَهریز که قناتی است تقریباً طولانی که امروزه از آن بیشتر برای آب‌یاری باغ‌ها استفاده می‌شود و همین‌طور جن دره ( که محلی ها به آن جینلی دَرَّ می‌گویند ) اشاره نمود.

این روستا در گذشته آب و هوای خوبی داشت و حتی در تابستان نیازی به وسایل خنک‌کننده نبود، در سالهای اخیر تابستان‌های این روستا نیز مانند جاهای دیگر کشور گرمتر شده است. از میوه‌های روستا می‌توان به گردو، توت ، انجیر، گیلاس و انگور اشاره نمود.

منابع

1. کمیته تخصصی نام‌نگاری و یکسان‌سازی نام‌های جغرافیایی ایران^{[پیوند مرده]}، سازمان نقشه‌برداری کشور
2. عزیزی علیرضا، جغرافیای ساوجبلاغ: روستاهای بخش مرکزی ساوجبلاغ، نشر رهام اندیشه، ۱۳۸۶

• روستاهای تاریخی ایران، بخش ساوجبلاغ، حسینی شلمزاری، ۱۳۸۴
• جغرافیای تاریخی شمیران، روستاهای حومه غرب تهران، هیو. نوشته دکتر منوچهر ستوده، تهران ۱۳۷۱
• ذکرالله زنجانی، شناسنامه تاریخی ساوجبلاغ و امامزادگان. به سفارش فرمانداری ساوجبلاغ. ۱۳۸۵شمسی

ن ب و  شهرستان ساوجبلاغ

رده:

• روستاهای شهرستان ساوجبلاغ

• این صفحه آخرین‌بار در ۲۸ نوامبر ۲۰۲۴ ساعت ۰۷:۵۹ ویرایش شده است.
• این صفحه با استفاده از پارسوئید رندر شده است.

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The war on Iran may become a turning point in the post-Cold War order

The Strait of Hormuz crisis has changed the calculations of every major power

Published 12 May, 2026 22:35

By Timofey Bordachev, Program Director of the Valdai Club

An Iranian flag is planted in the rubble of a police station, damaged in airstrikes yesterday, on March 3, 2026 in Tehran, Iran. © Getty Images / Majid Saeedi/Getty Images

The US and Israeli attack on Iran in February and their subsequent failure to achieve their objectives has already changed the strategic calculations of every major power. In some respects, it has also opened new opportunities for political dialogue. Seizing those opportunities would benefit international politics as a whole.

The Middle East has always been one of the most unstable regions in the world. Rivalries there rarely disappear; they merely evolve. States that are bitter enemies one year often find themselves entering temporary pragmatic arrangements the next. But these understandings are tactical rather than lasting. The region remains trapped in a cycle of recurring crises.

For decades, however, the instability of the Middle East was viewed as manageable. The conflicts were bloody, but they didn’t threaten the foundations of the international system itself. Even at the height of the Cold War, the region was seen by the great powers as an arena for competition rather than a place where they would risk everything.

There were two reasons for this. First, the Middle East never directly touched the vital survival interests of the major powers. The US and the USSR competed there intensely, and today the US, Russia and China all maintain important interests in the region, but none considered it worth a confrontation that could spiral into a global catastrophe. Second, no regional state possessed the capacity to impose a revolutionary political project on the wider world.

In this sense, Middle Eastern conflicts resembled a permanent wound in international politics: painful, dangerous, but ultimately containable.

Now, however, the situation has changed.

Read more

‘A war of necessity’: Germany marches East again

The most immediate consequence of the US-Israeli assault on Iran has been economic. Tehran’s response, particularly the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on American facilities in the Gulf, sent shockwaves through global markets. Energy supplies were disrupted almost overnight, affecting not only the West but also powers such as China and India. Fears of a broader recession spread rapidly.

What until recently seemed unthinkable has now become reality: a regional conflict has demonstrated its capacity to undermine the foundations of global economic interdependence.

The political consequences may prove even more significant.

For decades, the United States was viewed as a power capable of imposing its will militarily almost anywhere in the world. Even after failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, many still assumed that no regional state could seriously resist overwhelming American military superiority.

That perception has now suffered another severe blow.

The overthrow of the Venezuelan government earlier this year reinforced the image of an America still capable of reshaping weaker states at will. It was against that backdrop that many observers expected Iran’s political system to collapse rapidly under pressure. Instead, the opposite occurred.

Despite devastating strikes against senior figures and constant aerial attacks, the Iranian state endured. No mass uprising materialized. The armed forces continued functioning. The country’s governing structures proved far more resilient than Washington and West Jerusalem appear to have anticipated.

This doesn’t mean Iran has emerged victorious. The long-term consequences of the conflict remain unclear, but it does mean that the old assumption of automatic American military supremacy no longer looks convincing.

Read more

Maximum pressure, minimum victory: How the US lost the momentum in Iran

The reasons are not difficult to identify. Iran’s leadership and society proved capable of absorbing punishment without immediate political collapse. The attackers underestimated the cohesion of the state they were confronting. That miscalculation has implications far beyond the Middle East itself.

For the United States, this was a war of choice rather than necessity because Iran posed no existential threat to American survival. Israel, certainly, views Tehran as a strategic danger, but Israeli and American interests are not identical, regardless of how close their alliance may be.

That distinction matters because it explains why Washington, despite all its rhetoric, has shown no willingness to escalate toward the most extreme military options. America itself understands the limits of what it is prepared to risk.

Whatever the eventual outcome of the conflict, the Iranian episode is likely to provoke reflection in Washington. At the very least, it should force a reassessment of whether American ambitions still match American capabilities.

Yet such reflection will not come easily. The US political class has spent decades operating from a position of extraordinary global dominance. This has narrowed its worldview as American elites increasingly interpret international politics primarily through the prism of domestic political assumptions and ideological preferences.

At the same time, Washington has accumulated an enormous network of commitments across the globe. Maintaining them often creates pressure for exactly the sort of risky intervention that produced the current crisis.

Read more

Deutschland über alles? The world is not ready for German rearmament

China, meanwhile, also faces important strategic questions. Beijing has tried to maintain stable and pragmatic relations with the current American administration. But the attack on Iran, widely viewed outside the West as a blatant violation of international law, narrows China’s room for maneuver. It becomes harder for Beijing to treat relations with Washington as merely another economic negotiation.

The conflict has also exposed China’s vulnerability to instability in distant regions on which it nevertheless depends heavily for energy supplies and trade. Chinese firms have invested massively across the Middle East, including in Iran itself. The disruption caused by the war is likely to intensify debates within China about economic security and over-dependence on vulnerable maritime routes.

In time, Beijing may begin reconsidering the balance between global economic integration and strategic self-sufficiency.

For Russia, the consequences are more complex than many assume. In the short term, Moscow has benefited economically from higher commodity prices. The conflict has also shifted some international attention away from Eastern Europe. But Russia is not necessarily interested in a complete collapse of American influence in the Middle East.

Paradoxically, a limited and constrained American presence can contribute to the broader balance of international politics. Total chaos or the destruction of all diplomatic frameworks in the region would not serve Russian interests either.

This is why the Iranian crisis matters so profoundly. It is not simply another Middle Eastern war, but rather a moment that has forced all the major powers to confront uncomfortable questions about military force, economic vulnerability, strategic overreach and the changing structure of the international system itself.

The attack on Iran was intended to demonstrate strength. Instead, it has exposed uncertainty. And in doing so, it may yet create opportunities for a more realistic and restrained dialogue between the world’s major powers.

This article was first published by the Valdai Club and edited by the RT team.

ANALYSIS

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Intelligence reports contradict Trump’s claims about Iran – NYT

Iran has reportedly retained access to most of its missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz

Published 13 May, 2026 00:13

Missiles on display during a parade in Tehran, Iran, on February 11, 2026. ©  Fatemeh Bahrami / Anadolu / Getty Images.

Iran has retained most of its missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz, The New York Times reported on Tuesday, citing a classified intelligence assessment from earlier this month.

The report follows a series of publications in the American media contradicting President Donald Trump’s claims that Iran’s military had been largely destroyed during the US-Israeli bombing campaign that lasted from February 28 until a ceasefire took effect on April 8.

According to the Times, Iran has restored operational access to 30 of the 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz, which are capable of targeting US warships and tankers passing through the narrow waterway that normally handles about 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas trade. Iran closed the route to what it described as “enemy ships” in response to US and Israeli airstrikes and has since insisted on the right to control all maritime traffic and collect tolls.

Read more

Are US and Iran sliding back into war? What we know so far

The intelligence assessments cited by the Times reaffirmed earlier reports that Iran has retained about 70% of its mobile launchers and roughly 70% of its prewar missile stockpile.

Negotiations remain stalled after the US and Iran once again rejected each other’s proposals over the weekend as unacceptable. Trump has intensified threats to resume the military campaign, with media reports saying he has been briefed on additional strike options.

The US has demanded that Iran dismantle its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, which Tehran has rejected, insisting that its uranium enrichment activities are solely for civilian purposes.

Iran’s peace terms include an end to Israel’s war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the lifting of sanctions, reparations, and recognition of what Tehran calls its “sovereignty” over the Strait of Hormuz.