Aelius Gallus at Cleopatris (Suez)
. and on the Red Sea
Philip Mayerson
THE MILITARY EXPEDITION of Aelius Gallus to Arabia in
26/25 B.C.1 has attracted considerable scholarly comment
on his campaign regarding its chronology, the political and
economic reasons behind it, the identification of Arabian sites
mentioned in the sources, Gallus' misadventures caused by the
duplicity of his Nabataean guide Syllaeus or by his own
miscalculations, and his inglorious retreat to Egypt. Arabia has
been the focal point of interest, understandably so since little
was known of Rome's relationship with this exotic region at the
end of, or prior to, the first century B.C. The mounting of the
amphibious operation at Cleopatris, on the other hand, has been
generally ignored, perhaps because Strabo 16.4.23 is its only
source, whereas Pliny the Elder (HN 6.160ff), Josephus (AJ
15.317), Cassius Dio (53.29.3-8), and the Res Gestae Divi
Augusti (5.26) supplement Strabo's account of Gallus' campaign
in Arabia (16.4.23f). Be that as it may, the early phase of the
expedition bears upon the factors that led to Gallus' failure in
Arabia. It also raises questions regarding the historicity of
certain details in Strab(,)'s acc9unt,
Strabo tells us that Gallus "built not less than eighty boats,
biremes and triremes and light boats, at Cleopatris, which is
near the old canal (1tP0C; 'tn 1taA.al~ OlOOPUYl) that extends from
the Nile (to the Gulf of Suez)." When Gallus realized that
Syllaeus had deceived him into thinking he was to be opposed
by an Arabian navy, "he built. one hundred and thirty transport
vessels, on which he set sail with about 10,000 infantrymen
(1t£CO~C;~-." .
The issue at hand, apart from Syllaeus' double dealing, is
whether the campaign was properly mounted at Cleopatris
shortly after Augustus became master of Egypt. Was the site
1 Adopting the chronology of S. Jameson, ·Chronology of the Campaigns
of Aelius Gallus and C. Petronius," IRS 58 (1968) 71-84.
17
18 AELIUS GALLUS AT CLEOPATRIS
suitable as a shipyard. for the construction .o! a fleet of naval
vessels and for the mamtenance of a large mIlItary force? What
military and naval intelligence dictated the selection of
Cleopatris? How reliable is Strabo's information on this early
phase of Gallus' campaign?
In his discussion of the celebrated canal that Ptolemy II
successfully completed, linking the Nile with Arabian Gulf and
the Red Sea, Strabo (17.1.25), citing Artemidorus, informs us
that its outlet was near the city of Arsinoe "which some call
Cleopatris." This artery must be .. the old canal" cited at 16.4.23.
Another name, Clysma, crops up in post-Augustan sources in
association with a canal that bears the name "Trajan's River" or
"Trajan's Canal." Clysma is identified with, or situated near,
Ptolemaic Arsinoe.2 Cleopatris/ Arsinoe/Clysma was situated at
the head of the Gulf of Suez, near the present-day city of Suez.
2 See P. Mayerson, -The Port of Clysma (Suez) in Transition from Roman
to Arab Rule," ]NES, forthcoming; P. J. Sijpesteijn, -Der nOTAMOl:
TPAIANm:.· Aegyptus 46 (1963) 70-83. An excavation was conducted 1930-32
at the supposed site of Clysma by B. Bruyere and published as Fouilles
Clysma-Qolzoum (Suez) (Cairo 1966). The results of this limited excavation
were inconclusive, leading me to believe that more of Ptolemaic Arsinoe had
been unearthed than of Clysma.
PHILIP MAYERSON 19
For a city, a port, or a naval station, the site of Cleopatrisl Arsinoe/
Clysma was not a promising one. It lay on a treeless,
sandy plain that is arid in the extreme, receiving barely an inch
of rain during the year and lacking a perennial supply of water in
the form of a spring or a well. Its chief source of potable water
was at the oasis of 'Ayun Musa in Sinai, a few miles southeast of
the city and a mile inland. The oasis continued to serve the city
and shipping well into the nineteenth century with the
exception of those several times in history when a "sweet water
canal" connected the Nile with an outlet near Cleopatrisl Arsinoe/
Clysma.3 Without the availability of a fresh water canal,
the maintenance of a sizable population engaged in ship-building
and other occupations concerned with a military and naval
operation is hardly possible.
In 26 B.C., when Gallus was organizing his expedition, the old
(Ptolemaic) canal had undoubtedly silted up and fallen into
disuse. If it had been cleaned out, or another put in place, the
deed would have been celebrated by the name of the responsible
person, as it was with the royal names associated with the
Ptolemaic canal, and in the case of "Trajan's Canal; or when, in
641, the Umayyad Caliph 'Umar ordered the governor of Egypt
to clean the silt and debris from Trajan's Canal.4
The likelihood-if not the proof-that a Nile-Red Sea canal
was not in operation shortly before the time of Gallus' campaign
is to be found in Plutarch's description of Cleopatra's
attempt to shift her Mediterranean fleet of sixty ships to the
Red Sea. He relates (Ant. 69.3) that, in order to escape inevitable
defeat in the Mediterranean by the Romans, Cleopatra undertook
to dry-haul her ships over' the isthmus of Suez (300 stadia
of desert) and then launch them in the Arabian Gulf (Gulf of
Suez). After the first few ships on land were burned by
Nabataeans, and then persuaded by Antony that all was not lost,
she abandoned the attempt.
In re-editing P.Oxy. XXXVII 2820, N. Lewis viewed the
document as relating to the prefecture of Aelius Gallus rather
than Cornelius Gallus. He suggested as a possibility that lines
J See Western Arabia and the Red Sea (=Geographical Handbooks Series,
Naval Intelligence Division [Oxford, June 1946]); E. Honigmann and R. Y.
Ebied, -al-Kulzum," Encyclopedia of Islam2 V (Leiden 1986) 368.
4 Mayerson (supra n.2); A. Butler, The Arab Conquest of Egypt (Oxford
1902) 345ff; S. Lane-Poole, A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages (repr.
London 1968) 20.
20 AELIUS GALLUS AT CLEOPATRIS
5-11 ("and he refitted Cleopatra's [Mediterranean] fleet, which
had-understandably-been neglected after her death.... ")
referred to Aelius' use of the ships for his expedition to Arabia
Felix by way of a canal between the Nile and Cleopatris. s
It is clear from Plutarch's account, however, that a canal, at
least a navigable canal, was not available for Cleopatra when she
put her plan into operation. If there had been, she certainly
would not have resorted to a desperate maneuver over desert
terrain.6 As for Gallus, though lacking a navigable canal, he may
have had a sufficient supply of fresh water if the old Ptolemaic
canal continued to drain water from Nile to its outlet near
Cleopatris. It does not appear likely that he had either on two
accounts: the rapid silting of the canal required constant
removal of sand and debris; and if Nile water flowed into a
partially silted canal, the river would have to be at high flood.
There are further considerations. The construction of over
two hundred vessels would have required a huge amount of
men and material that, in the absence of a navigable canal, would
have to be transported over the desert to Cleopatris. Timber
suitable for boatbuilding was not native to Egypt.? One would
5 - P.Oxy. 2820: Whose Preparations?" GRBS 16 (1975) 295-303. This fragmentary
document has raised considerable comment without arriving at any
consensus as to whom it refers and what it is all about. See H. Hauben,
-Gallus Apostata. Encore Le POXY. 2820," P.Congr. XVII (1984) III 1085-97;
N. Lewis, -P. Oxy. 2820: Gallus .... Vous dites Gallus?" ChrEg 62 (1987)
219-22.
, Diodorus Siculus (1.33), after describing (in the past tense) Ptolemy'S
successful completion of the Nile-Red Sea canal and the clever lock devised to
keep the two waters in balance, shifts to the present tense and states: -The
river which flows through this canal is named Ptolemy, after the builder of it,
and has its mouth at the city called Arsinoe." In view of Cleopatra's
experience-and she, if anybody, would have known if the old canal was in
operation-Diodorus must be citing an old tradition. There is the possibility,
if the old canal was not silted up, that a low Nile flood made it impossible for
Cleopatra's ships to make their way to the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea. It
should be noted, however, that in Bruyere's excavation (supra n.2: 90-95), no
Roman coins before the time of Hadrian were recovered; most were dated
between 260 and 340. If Bruyere had continued his work and proceeded
along the lines of modern archaeological methodology, we might have had
firm evidence whether a substantial first-century site existed at Cleopatris, and
further whether the canal was in operation during the period of Cleopatra's
and Gallus' activities.
7 See G. F. Hourani, Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and
Early Medie'lJal Times (Princeton 1951) 89ff; L. Casson, Ships and Seamanship
in the Ancient World (Princeton 1971)4, 212£.
PHILIP MAYERSON 21
have to assume that a supply of wood and other naval supplies
were on hand in Egyrt or had to be brought in from abroad.
The complexity 0 an operation this size is reflected during
early years of the Arab occupation of Egypt when the
Umayyad caliphs diverted the Roman grain tax (EJ.1~oA.fl) to
Mecca in place of Constantinople. Trajan's canal was cleared of
silt and debris so as to make the waterway suitable for navigation
between Babylon and Clysma. From the meticulously
maintained registers and accounts of the pagarchy of Aphrodito
and requests from the Arab governor of Egypt, we learn of the
bustling activity that was needed to fashion a fleet of graincarrying
transports. P.Lond. IV alone has eighty-four references
to Clysma covering specialized craftsmen, laborers, supplies
and equipment, sailors and marines, ships, provisions, travel
expenses, and various odds and ends. 8
If we accept Jameson's chronology of the expedition (supra
n.t: 77), it began in the spring or summer of 26 B.C. and ended in
autumn (October or November) of 25. Fourteen days after
departing Cleopatris, Gallus arrived at Leuke Come where,
before continuing his campaign, he rested his troops for a
period of six months (from AugustlSeptember of 26 to
Marchi April of 25). If this is a reasonable assessment of the
evidence, Gallus spent about four months, from April to
August of 26, mounting the expedition and building eighty
warships and 103 transport vessels under the most trying
conditions. Unless Jameson's chronology is inaccurate, a
shipbuilding operation of this size does not seem possible
within that period of time, given that there was no dire
emergency to compel him to proceed under forced-draft.
The advisability of selecting Cleopatris as the site from which
to launch the campaign and sail to Leuce Come must also be
called into question. It is true that the prevailing northerly
winds would facilitate sailing out of the Gulf of Suez into the
Red Sea, but heading east-north-east in the Red Sea toward
Leuce Come ('Aynunah), near the southern entrance to the
Gulf of Aqaba, would be loaded with dangers. It would mean
sailing around the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula, in the
vicinity of Ras Muhammad, where there is a meeting of strong
northerly winds coming from the two gulfs. Arabian navigators
• -IO.uOIlQ" in S. Daris, ed., Dizionario dei nomi geografici dell' Egitto grecoromano
III (Milan 1978) 127; Mayerson (supra n.2).
22 AELIUS GALLUS AT CLEOPATRIS
especially feared sailing in these water of the Red Sea,9 as Gallus
found to his regret. Strabo, in describing this part of the
campaign, reports (16.4.23) that he arrived at Leuce Come
having "lost many of his boats, some of these being lost, crews
and all, on account of difficult sailing, but not on account of any
enemy." Gallus' traumatic experience in the northern waters of
the Red Sea must have necessitated resting and regrouping his
exhausted men for six months at Leuce Come before continuing
his march into Arabia Felix.
Steve Sidebotham offers a different view of the suitability of
Cleopatris for the initial phase of the campaign. He holds that
the determining factors in selecting Cleopatris over ports
further south were that timber necessary for shipbuilding was
more readily available at Cleopatris, and that the site could more
easily shelter, water, and feed an extra 10,000 men than at one of
the other Red Sea ports. Rather than transport supplies across
the Eastern Desert, Cleopatris, relatively close to the Nile and
the Delta, made that task less burdensome. He also maintains
that prevailing northerly winds in the Gulf of Suez facilitated
sailing to Leuce Come, but departing from Berenice, Leukos
Limen, or Myos Hormos, which might have made more
military sense, meant having to beat against unfavorable winds. 10
Sidebotham's position regarding the availablility of water and
shipbuilding material runs contrary to conditions at Cleopatris
during the last quarter of the first century B.C. As stated above,
the isthmus of Suez was harsh desert devoid of vegetation and
water; limited amounts of water were available at a distance, at
'Ayun Musa in Sinai. 11 As for sailing conditions, . whatever
advantages the prevailing northerlies gave Gallus' fleet in the
Gulf of Suez were lost once they passed into the Red Sea.
Having to head north-north-east toward Leuke Come, the
ships faced the strong northerly winds pouring out of the Gulf
of 'Aqaba, which meant that they had to be rowed rather than
9 C. H. Becker and C. F. Beckingham, -Bahr al-Kulzum," Encyclopedia of
Islam2 I (Leiden 1960) 931. For a summary of the evidence for siting Leuce
Come at 'Aynunah, see L. Casson, Periplus Maris Erythraei (Princeton 1989)
143f.
10 Roman Economic Policy in the Erythra Thalassa, 30 B.C.-A.D. 217
(Leiden 1986) 122f.
II Mayerson (supra n.2); Western Arabia (supra n.3). Later Arab sources
(Honigmann and Ebied [supra n.3]) mention the well at al-Suways (=Suez)
that yielded only a scanty supply of brackish water.
PHILIP MAYERSON 23
sailed to their destination. Strabo has adequately described the
disastrous outcome of the fourteen days that Gallus and his
men endured on the Cleopatris-Leuce Come leg of the journey.
In hindsight, Gallus might have been wiser to have started
out at one of the Red Sea ports, Myos Hormus for example,
and to have sailed eastward to the coast of Arabia and then to
row, if necessary, northward along the coast to Leuce Come.
At a later period, Muslim pilgrims preferred travelling through
the desert to 'Aydhab on the Red Sea and then go by sea to
Jidda rather than face the rigors of a long journey over windswept
waters and dangerous shoals. 12
To sum up, it is not enough to say that Gallus was an easy tool
in the hands of Syllaeus, or that Strabo was using the latter's
duplicity to cover up the inadequacies of his friend. Much of
this may be true, but what the expedition needed, before
complying with Augustus' orders to explore Arabia, was good
military intelligence. Strabo attributes to Syllaeus' treachery his
saying that there was no way to go to Leuce Come by land
when in fact great numbers of men and camels went there with
ease and safety. Had Gallus, or his officers, gathered information
from Egyptian and Nabataean traders in Egypt concerning
movement to Leuce Come, he might have opted for another
means of reaching his objective. A simple inquiry as to the
terrain in Arabia should also have dissuaded him from taking
infantry men (1t£~ou~) for the expedition.H
Unfortunately, we have only Strabo's account of the early
phase of Gallus' campaign, but, unless the chronology is far off,
it is evident that Gallus could not have built and equipped over
200 ships in a period of four or even six months. It is further
evident that he undertook the expedition without seeking information
regarding alternative routes, both by land and sea, and
the nature of the terrain in Arabia. 14 Bungling and naive he may
12 Hourani (supra n.7) 82.
Il It appears that Gallus had far better military intelligence for his return to·
Egypt, for he debarked his troops at Egra, sailed to Myos Hormos, marched
over the desert to Coptos on the Nile, and landed at Alexandria (Strabo
16.4.24).
14 Aelius could have profited from the disastrous experience of Crassus, who
fought against the Parthians without knowledge of the enemy's military
tactics and the character of the Mesopotamian desert, and who was taken in,
as had Aelius, by a duplicitous Arab. See Pluto Crass. 22ff. According to W. W.
Tarn (CAR IX 607), "Crassus had not the least idea of what he was going to
24 AELH)"S GALLUS AT CLEOPATRIS
have been, but the likelihood is that he lacked military
experience in the field (as his brief resume in RE seems to
indicate). As for Strabo's account of events at Cleopatris and on
the Red Sea, there is a deeper subtext to it than use of Syllaeus'
duplicity as the cause of a friend's misfortune; but lacking
confirmation in other sources, it has to be considered as a
questionable part of an ill-conceived and poorly executed
military operation.
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
June, 1995
meet; but many Greeks must have known, and the most serious count against
him is his neglect of Greek sources of information."
